Yes No Share to Facebook
Reasonably Foreseeable
Involves Remoteness Principles Regarding a View to Risk of Harm
Last Updated: July 04 2026
Question: What does reasonable foreseeability mean in negligence law when deciding whether harm is too remote to hold someone liable?
Answer: In Ontario negligence claims, Lo Greco Law can help explain that “foreseeability” is assessed using an objective, reasonable-person lens: the court asks whether, before the incident, a person in the defendant’s position ought to have rationally anticipated that the conduct could cause harm, and whether the risk was a “real risk” that would occur to the mind of a reasonable person rather than being far-fetched. This inquiry links to remoteness, meaning liability is limited where the harm is too unrelated to the wrongful conduct to fairly hold the defendant responsible, and hindsight is not supposed to cloud the analysis. If you are dealing with a potential negligence dispute in Ontario, a 30+ year experienced lawyer at Lo Greco Law including LSO tribunal representation can help you evaluate foreseeability, causation, and liability and plan your next steps; call (416) 488-4110 today.
What Is Meant By Foreseeability and Remoteness Principles Within a Negligence Case?
Foreseeability Involves the Review of Whether An Incident That Resulted In Harm Was Something That a Reasonable Person Could Think of As Having a Possibility of Occurring.
Understanding Reasonable Foreseeability Including Remoteness Principles Regarding Risk of Causing Harm
Negligence law includes the principle of reasonable foreseeability. Reasonable foreseeability involves the question of whether a reasonable person could envision the risk of harm arising from the specific conduct in question. As a fundamental component of negligence law principles requires an analysis of what a reasonable person would do or avoid doing, analyzing what a reasonable person would view as risky becomes necessary within a negligence liability discussion.
The Law
In the cases of Rankin (Rankin’s Garage & Sales) v. J.J., [2018] 1 S.C.R. 587, as well as Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd., [2008] 2 S.C.R. 114, the Supreme Court explained the concept of reasonable foreseeability and remoteness whereas it was said:
[53] Whether or not something is “reasonably foreseeable” is an objective test. The analysis is focussed on whether someone in the defendant’s position ought reasonably to have foreseen the harm rather than whether the specific defendant did. Courts should be vigilant in ensuring that the analysis is not clouded by the fact that the event in question actually did occur. The question is properly focussed on whether foreseeability was present prior to the incident occurring and not with the aid of 20/20 hindsight: L. N. Klar and C.S.G. Jefferies, Tort Law (6th ed. 2017), at p. 212.
[12] The remoteness inquiry asks whether “the harm [is] too unrelated to the wrongful conduct to hold the defendant fairly liable” (Linden and Feldthusen, at p. 360). Since The Wagon Mound (No. 1), the principle has been that “it is the foresight of the reasonable man which alone can determine responsibility” (Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.), at p. 424).
[13] Much has been written on how probable or likely a harm needs to be in order to be considered reasonably foreseeable. The parties raise the question of whether a reasonably foreseeable harm is one whose occurrence is probable or merely possible. In my view, these terms are misleading. Any harm which has actually occurred is “possible”; it is therefore clear that possibility alone does not provide a meaningful standard for the application of reasonable foreseeability. The degree of probability that would satisfy the reasonable foreseeability requirement was described in The Wagon Mound (No. 2) as a “real risk”, i.e. “one which would occur to the mind of a reasonable man in the position of the defendan[t] . . . and which he would not brush aside as far-fetched” (Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co. Pty., [1967] A.C. 617 (P.C.), at p. 643).
[14] The remoteness inquiry depends not only upon the degree of probability required to meet the reasonable foreseeability requirement, but also upon whether or not the plaintiff is considered objectively or subjectively. One of the questions that arose in this case was whether, in judging whether the personal injury was foreseeable, one looks at a person of “ordinary fortitude” or at a particular plaintiff with his or her particular vulnerabilities. This question may be acute in claims for mental injury, since there is a wide variation in how particular people respond to particular stressors. The law has consistently held — albeit within the duty of care analysis — that the question is what a person of ordinary fortitude would suffer: see White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police, [1998] 3 W.L.R. 1509 (H.L.); Devji v. Burnaby (District) (1999), 180 D.L.R. (4th) 205, 1999 BCCA 599; Vanek. As stated in White, at p. 1512: “The law expects reasonable fortitude and robustness of its citizens and will not impose liability for the exceptional frailty of certain individuals.”
In the Rankin and Mustapha cases, foreseeability is defined as the question of whether a person could rationally predict that certain conduct might bring about harm to another person. Furthermore, following the guidance of Rankin and Mustapha cases, while evaluating whether harm was foreseeable, a court should approach the question from a retro-active yet forward-looking perspective instead of looking back perspective after an incident has actually occurred..
Summary Comment
Negligence law involves the review of whether a person acted carelessly and should be held liable for harm caused through such carelessness to another person. As part of the question of whether conduct was careless, the question arises as to whether the resulting harm was foreseeable. Negligence fails to arise if harm from the conduct in question was reasonably unforeseeable.